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The Count of Psyche : The birth of
bio-politics and bio-ethics in early
modern China
Joyce C. H. Liu
[Vitalpolitik is] “a policy of life, which is not
essentially orientated to increased earnings and
reduced hours of work, like traditional social
policy, but which takes cognizance of the worker’s
whole vital situation, his real, concrete situation,
from morning to night and from night to
morning,” material and moral hygiene, the sense
of property, the sense of social integration,
etcetera, being in his view as important as
earnings and hours of work.
Rüstow, quoted by F. Bilger, La Pensée économique
libérale, p. 106; re-quoted by Foucault, The Birth of
Biopolitics. p. 157n.
Political economy … is not a system for controlling
men’s actions, but for discovering how men are
induced by their natural propensities to act. 
John Hill Burton’s Chambers’s Educational Course:
Political Economy for Use in Schools, and for
Private Instruction, p. 49, emphasis mine.
1 This essay examines the complicit hidden ties between the rise of liberalist economic
subject and the discursive mode of domination of bio-ethical life in modern China. In late
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, there emerged a wide spread
nexus of  discourse related to the formulation of  a powerful  psyche-force of  the new
people for modern China. This mode of discursive formulation presents on the one hand
the  psyche  that  is  an  autonomous  and  free  agent  in  the  line  of  production  for  the
individual’s own interest, while at the same time the psyche force is described as a
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countable, calculable, correctable, controllable and utilizable moral force or capital for
the interest of the nation and the coming civil society. The individual at this converging
point  both  as  the  liberalist  political  economic  agent  and  as  the  ethical-calculable
nationalist  moral  subject  is  then placed within the nationalist  project  of  cultivation,
training and correction.  The aim of this essay is  to answer the question why,  in the
Chinese  context  historically  and  culturally,  the  modern  subject  is  so  prone  to  the
domination of the nationalist sentiments. I would like to argue that, long before the May
Fourth intellectuals’ efforts to awake the enlightenment movement in the 1919, the mode
of  a  governable  and  calculable  modern  subject  had  been  established  through  the
revolutionary intellectuals’ discursive responses to the contemporary world. It is what I
called the moments of the birth of ethical-bio-politics in early modern China. In order to
probe effectively into the complexity of this issue, I need to first run through the main
argument in Foucault’s book The The Birth of Biopolitics:  Lectures at the Collège de France
1978-1979. I consider Fouault’s lectures of this year a significant link to his later lectures
on the  ethical  subject  and the  hermeneutics  of  subject  that  point  to  the  ambiguous
problems of bio-politics of today.
 
1. The crossroads of political economy and the rise of
new civil society
2 In Foucault’s lectures during 1978-1979 on the birth of biopolitics, the double movement
of the mechanism of liberalist political economic is closely studied and localized: on the
one hand, it relies on the individual’s volunteering and autonomous commitment with his
free will to work and to exercise his potential; one the other hand, it takes the entire life
of  the  individual,  including  the  physical  and  moral  hygiene,  into  account  for  the
management and production for the enterprise. According to Foucault, starting from the
eighteenth  century,  there  is  the  attempt  in  the  discourse  of  political  economy  to
rationalize the problems posed to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of
a set of living beings forming a population. Foucault takes liberalism as a principle and
method of the rationalization of the exercise of government, a rationalization that obeys
“the  internal  rule  of  maximum  economy.”  (Foucault  2008:  318)  Even  though  liberal
thought starts from the civil society instead of the state, the question behind it is how to
govern. In this line of thought, government becomes necessary and the justification of its
existence  defines  the  ends  it  pursues  with  regard  to  the  particular  society.  The
technology of a particular government and its forms of schematization is actually derived
from the rationalization of the composition of that society. When the logic of political
economy is superimposed on the logic of social governmentality, it gives rise to what
Foucault called the “birth of biopolitics.” 
3 The intriguing problem about the liberalist economic subject or the economic man, homo
oeconomicus, is that, although it is let alone to do his own work in the economic system,
following the principle of laisser-faire, his is “eminently governable.” (Foucault 2008: 270)
The individual would pursue his own interest, but his interest has already been posited in
the  way  that  it  would  converge  spontaneously  with  the  interest  of  others.  Homo
oeconomicus,  according  to  Foucault,  is  actually  the  person “who accepts  reality”  and
therefore “someone manageable,  someone who responds systematically  to systematic
modifications  artificially  introduced  into  the  environment,”  and  consequently  “the
correlate of a governmentality.” (Foucault 2008: 270-271) The paradox of the liberalist
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economic man Foucault presents in his studies points to the fact that, instead of an atom
of freedom, the home oeconomicus is already a certain type of subject who precisely enable
an art  of  government to be determined according to the principle  of  economy.  This
problem  of  home  oeconomicus leads  Foucault  to  reconsider  the  concept  of  subject
introduced by English empiricism, that is, a subject not defined by his freedom, or by the
opposition of body and soul, or by the presence of something marked by the Fall or sin,
but  a  form  of  subject  of  individual  choices  which  are  both  irreducible  and  non-
transferable. This irreducible and non-transferable point is the “regressive end point” of
the  rationality,  judgment,  reasoning,  or  calculation  of  the  individual  choices  and  is
referred to the subject himself  as “interest.” This “subject of  interest,” whether it  is
related to self-preservation or to sympathy, is primarily based on “subjective will.” Even
though subjected and constrained by the contract,  the “subject  of  interest” remains,
subsists and continues up to the time of the juridical contract and overflows the “subject
of right.” (Foucault 2008: 272-274)
4 The different logic governing the subject of interest and the subject of right is that the
subject  of  right  is  by  definition a  split  subject  who acknowledges  some natural  and
immediate rights but also agrees to the principle of self-renunciation, as what law and the
prohibition function in the juridical system, but the subject of interest, according to the
economists,  never  has  to  relinquish  his  interest.  Foucault  points  out  that  in  the
eighteenth century, the figure of home oeconomicus and the figure of homo juridicus or homo
legalis are heterogeneous and cannot be superimposed on each other. Foucault refers to
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and stressed the importance of the “invisibility” of the
hand of the “totality” which eludes the individual while at the same time founds the
rationality of his egoistic choices and, Foucault adds, “if the totality of the process eludes
each economic man, there is however a point where the whole is completely transparent
to a sort of gaze of someone whose invisible hand, following the logic of this gaze and
what it sees, draws together the threads of all these dispersed interest.” The invisibility of
the collective good is essential to the process because the collective good “must not be an
objective” and “cannot not be calculated.” (Foucault 2008: 278-280) No economic agent or
political agent should or could account for the totality of the process of the collective
good. Foucault writes:
Thus the economic world is naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable. It is
originally and definitively constituted from a multiplicity of points of view which is
all  the  more  irreducible  as  this  same  multiplicity  assures  their  ultimate  and
spontaneous  convergence.  Economics  is  an  atheistic  discipline;  economics  is  a
discipline without God; economics is a discipline without totality; economics is a
discipline  that  begins  to  demonstrate  not  only  the  pointlessness,  but  also  the
impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state that he has to
govern. Economics steals away from the juridical form of the sovereign exercising
sovereignty within a state precisely that which is emerging as the essential element
of  a  society’s  life,  namely  economic  processes.  Liberalism  acquired  its  modern
shape precisely with the formulation of this essential incompatibility between the
non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and the totalizing unity of
the juridical sovereign. (Foucault 2008: 282, emphasis mine)
5 To  Foucault,  the  heterogeneity  and  incompatibility  of  the  economic  world  and  the
political-juridical  world  of  the  eighteenth  century  could  serve  as  a  critique  of
governmental reason. The basic function of Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand is
to disqualify the political sovereign. But, throughout the nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries, different forms of socialism, state socialism and the state-controlled economy,
The Count of Psyche : The birth of bio-politics and bio-ethics in early moder...
Appareil, 4 | 2010
3
all tried to work out some kind of definition of the economic sovereignty. The principle of
laissez-faire in the physiocrats, for example, is to establish the correspondence between
the sovereign and the economic processes or the economic agents, basing on the evidence
and the Economic Table they constructed. It is here, Foucault says, that we find the idea
that “economic agents must be allowed their freedom” and that “a political sovereignty
will cover the totality of the economic process with a gaze in the uniform light, as it were,
of evidence.” (Foucault 2008: 285-286) 
6 What Foucault offers is a very complex picture of the intersection and crossroad of the
political  economic  and  the  political  governmentality.  According  to  Foucault,  Adam
Smith’s theory from the start was not meant to serve as governmentality rationality.
“Economic science cannot be the science of government and economics cannot be the
internal principle, law, rule of conduct, or rationality of government.” (Foucault 2008:
286) But, when the two incompatible worlds collate and superimposed on one another,
the questions arises: how is the theory of the invisible hand served as the governmental
rationality? How is the theory of civil society served as the converging point of political
economic and governmentality rationality? The governability or governmentability of
the economic subject is made possible through a “new ensemble” which makes him both
subject of right and subject of economic agents, and this convergence brings in what
Foucault  calls  “the  liberal  art  of  governing,”  the  field  where  such  liberalist
governmentality could exercise is “civil society.” (Foucault 2008: 294-295)
7 Here is the crucial  question that Foucault proposes in his seminar,  and it  is also the
central  concern  of  my  current  study:  what  is  the  rationality  and  the  technology  to
govern, according to the rule of right, the civil society, a space of sovereignty which is
inhabited  by  economic  subject?  Foucault  points  out  that  civil  society  is  not  a
philosophical idea, but a concept of governmental technology, and the problem of civil
society is “the juridical structure of a governmentality pegged to the economic
structure.” Foucault writes:
And I think that civil society—which is very quickly called society, and which at the
end of the eighteenth century is called the nation—makes a self-limitation possible
for governmental practice and an art of government, for reflection on this art of
government and so for a governmental technology. … An omnipresent government,
a government which nothing escapes, a government which conforms to the rules of
right,  and  a  government  which  nevertheless  respects  the  specificity  of  the
economy, will be a government that manages civil society, the nation, society, the
social. (Foucault 2008: 296)
8 How should the subject be managed so that he can be left alone, laisser-faire, and work for
his own interest while the whole nation or the civil society can benefit according to the
rationality  of  the  government?  The  omnipresent  government  is  built  upon  these
autonomous  economic  subjects.  “Homo  oeconomicus is,  if  you like,  the  abstract,  ideal,
purely economic point that inhabits the dense, full, and complex reality of civil society.
Or, alternatively, civil society is the concrete ensemble within which these ideal points,
economic men, must be placed so that they can be appropriately managed.” (Foucault
2008: 296) It is in this same ensemble of the technology of liberal governmentality that
homo oeconomicus and civil society belong.
9 The irony is clear here. The civil society invoked to resist against the government or the
state, the state apparatuses or institutions, turns out to be the very thing that forms part
of modern governmental technology. Foucault demonstrates how Adam Smith’s economic
analysis is transformed in Furgerson’s text as the theories of civil  society,  combining
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Smith’s  concept  of  nation,  including  viewing  civil  society  as  an  historical-natural
constant,  with  spontaneous  synthesis  of  individuals,  a  permanent  matrix  of  political
power and that it constitutes the “motor of history.” The civil society or the nation is the
motor  of  history  precisely because  it  is  not  only  the  spontaneous  synthesis  and
subordination but it also carries the element of dissociation, that is, the egoism of homo
oeconomicus. The multiplications and modifications of the blind initiatives of the egoist
interests and individual calculations are infinite, and the transformation of civil society is
endless. This never-ending generation of history makes the formation of new social fabric
possible. Also, civil society calls for a government as an organic component of the social
bond as an organic feature of the form of authority. These characteristics make the civil
society in Furguson’s text very different from that of Hobbes, Rousseau and Montesquieu
because the economic problems are introduced into new technologies of government.
(Foucault 2008: 298-308)
10 The crossroads  Foucault  analyzes  in  Furguson’s  text  reveal  a domain  opening  up  of
collective and political units which go beyond the purely economic bond, and yet without
being purely juridical, and that this space cannot be superimposed on the structures of
the contract and the game of rights. But, the demand for a new form of civil society gives
rise to new forms of sovereign individuality basing on the strategy of interests of the
individual sovereign, and to new forms of truth that is manifested through the rationality
of history. Just as what Foucault points out, since the sixteen and seventeenth century in
the West,  the exercise of  power has been adjusted according to calculation of  force,
relations, wealth and factors of strength. Rationality becomes the foundation of modern
forms of governmental technology. Different forms of rationality, the rationality of the
sovereign state,  of  economic  agents,  of  the  governed,  speak about  different  ways  of
calculating and regulating the art  of  government.  The principle  of  rationality  of  the
nationalist and statist politics as well as the rationality of the truth regime continue in
spite of the transformations of the technologies of governmentality. The birth of the new
forms of calculation and regulation of the civil  society or the nationalist state in the
twentieth century, ways of governing the population, including health, hygiene, birth,
race, and so on, is founded precisely through the long process of the discourse of political
economy since mid-eighteenth century down to the nineteenth century. 
11 To me,  the problem lies more in how in such crossroads and intersections,  with the
cleaving up and opening of new space for civil society, even though the juridical system
and economic bond has not been established yet, the discursive modes of new ways of
calculation and regulation has already infiltrated in the same texts. The crucial question
is: how the individual in the society, a society in the making, a society that is invoked to
rebel  against the present government,  is  accounted for the rise either of  a new civil
society or a new nation state, and through what irreducible rationality and reasoning
these individuals are posited. The texts that I would like to examine in this current essay
point to what I called the moments of the birth of ethical-bio-politics in modern China. I
would like to argue that, in late Qing China, at the end of the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the twentieth century, on the eve of the republic’s revolution, and twenty
years  before  the  May  Fourth  Enlightenment  Movement,  the  emerging  new mode  of
discourse on the “count” of psyche among the intellectuals gives rise to the rationality of
psyche ruling for later governments. With the borrowed Western knowledge of modern
physics and chemistry on the one hand, and the theories of political economy and the
civil society/nation state on the other hand, Chinese intellectuals, through the aids of the
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missionaries  in  China  and  the  translated  texts  from  Japan,  build  up  a  mode  of
hermeneutics  on  psyche  that  stresses  on  the  countable,  utilizable,  controllable,
accumulative, and correctable nature of psyche. Psyche force was described as the force,
using the metaphor of electricity, to be tamed and directed so that it can serve the aims
of the State. Moreover, the individual’s psyche force was accounted as part of the national
capital and as a share that is responsible for the production of the national interest, in
Benthamian reasoning. Liang Qichao’s essay on the “New People” was an exemplary text
that demonstrated how the ethical subject was constructed in the way that the bio (life)
and the ethics  of  the individuals  were discursively formulated in an ethico-political-
economic to contribute to the collective good defined in the name of nation.
 
2. Liang Qichao and the ethical-political economy for
the new people 
12 Liang  Qichao  was  the  most  prominent  revolutionary  intellectual  among  those  who
welcomed and elaborated the rejuvenated China through the rejuvenated psyche power
of the citizen of a coming society in late Qing China. Liang Qichao fled to Japan with his
teacher Kang Youwei after the failure of the short-lived Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898,
and stayed abroad in exile for 15 years. During this period of exile, he studied Western
knowledge extensively through Chinese translations as well as Japanese translations, and
he reintroduced them into Chinese in new forms embedded with his erudite knowledge of
classical Chinese texts. His enormous amount of writings greatly influenced the path of
Chinese modernization. 
13 To reform and build a modern China, Liang Qichao places his hope not in the leader but in
the people. Liang develops his idea of the capacity and the rights of people in his seminal
book On the New People (xinminshuo, 新民說  1902) as the foundation for a strong nation-
state. He stresses that, to resist the expanding forces of the national imperialism of the
foreign nations, the only method to take was through reinforcing the people’s own sense
of nationalism. (Liang,  On the New People 657) He uses the analogy of biological body to
compare with the State: the State is composed with its people, as if a body is composed
with its limbs, intestines, nerves and veins. If the parts and limbs were weak, diseased or
even broken, the body could not maintain its proper condition and would even perish.
The same case could be applied to the State. If we wanted the State to be strong and
wealthy, Liang suggests, we first had to consider the ways to maintain the nutrition and
life of the State by ways of cultivating its new people. (Liang,  On the New People 655) Liang
Qichao, commenting on Rousseau, emphasizes the importance of the public opinion and
the  juridical  contract,  in  addition  to  the  physiological  vision  of  the  state,  as  the
foundation for the operation of the nation. On top of the physiological formulation of the
juridical  and contractual  relation between the individual  and the State,  Liang Qichao
situates the ethical position of the individual in the mode of economic production. Liang
lists and elaborates the meaning of each of the moral virtues, so called common virtues (
gongde), the aim of which, to Liang Qichao, are to lead to the people’s political ability of
qun, being a social member, and to enhance the interest of the society (liqun 利群): to
consolidate the group, improve the group and make it progress. The common virtues are
indispensible in Liang’s portrayal of a new society, such as responsibility, autonomous
self-governing,  self-esteem,  bravery,  endurance,  advantageousness,  progressiveness,
aggressiveness, cooperativeness. In between the lines, Liang brings in various classical
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Chinese Confucian texts  to  reinforce the concepts  of  the virtues  so  that  his  Chinese
readers can appreciate right away his reasong, and the texts he cites includes not only the
four classics, Analects of Confucius, Mencius, Great Learning, Doctrine of the Mean,  but also
Spring and Autumn Annals, Mozi, Xun Zi, Liezi, and Zhan Guo Ce (strategies of the Warring
States).  ( Liang,  On the New People, pp. 656, 657, 661, 691, 705, 712) There is an obvious move
toward a  positive,  aggressive,  warring and martial  interpretation of  Confucianism in
Liang’s selection of those classical texts.
14 How does Liang define the social, qun? How does he define the interest of the society,
liqun? “Qun” in Chinese stands for the social, the group or society, and “Li” stands for
“interest.”  Liang clearly  defined the capacity  for  qun, being a  social  member,  as  the
demarcation that differentiates the human from the beast. He says that if a society cannot
be formed among the people, then humanity could barely exist. The best form of society
that suited the people, Liang suggests, is nation-state (guojia). Due to the differences of
languages, customs, thoughts, laws and institutions, it’s necessary and natural for people
to establish their own nation-state. Nation-state is the proper group established for the
people to deal with foreign groups. The people should fight for and protect their nation-
state till the last minute, even to the extent of sacrificing their own lives, so that the
sovereignty of their nation-state would not be endangered.  ( Liang,  On the New People, 663)
Liang Qichao denounces the utopian notion of the universe as the existential frame for
human beings and insists that if there were no nations-state, then there would be no
competition among one another, and hence no progress of civilization. Furthermore, he
stresses, if the boundaries among nations-states disappeared, then the human gatherings
would regress into the tribal conditions. It would then be what Liang calls the barbarian
or even savage states. People would remain in a savage or barbarous state if they could
not form a nation-state. Therefore, the nation-state is considered as the best evolved
form  that  is  suitable  as  human  society  and  as  the  convergence  of  self-love  and
benevolence.  ( Liang,  On the New People, 663) 
15 What then is the role of “interest” in Liang’s formulation of the “new people” in such
evolutionist vision of the State? Liang Qichao encourages people not only to fight for
their “self-interest” but also to aim at the “real self-interest” (zhenliji). So-called “real
self-interest” is defined in terms of the nation-state. One has to nourish the thoughts of
interest of society, that is, the nation-state, so that they can forever secure their own
interests. Liang Qichao even analyzes the modes of production according to the interest
of the nation-state and specifies that ducation and cultivation are necessary methods to
strengthen the nation-state. Liang compares the State as a corporation, and the imperial
court as the business office. In order to produce and maintain the interests (「生利」) of
the nation-state, it is necessary to demand the force of production from the people. Liang
defines the forces of production as physical force and psyche force (xinli 心力), the later
involved the intellectual force (zhili 智力) and the moral force (deli 德力). He insists that
the prosperity or the fall of a nation-state depends on its capacity for production and its
total capital and total labor.  ( Liang,  On the New People, 696) To make sure that the people
take  production  as  the  individual’s  responsibility,  he  stresses  that  people  should  be
educated so that they would even feel “ashamed” for being only the one who shared the
interests  but  not  the one who produced them.   ( Liang,   On the  New People,  702)  In his
formulation,  not  only  physical  productivity  but  also  intellectual  as  well  as  moral
productivity are counted in the line of production. Everyone in the nation is considered
as a member in the system of the production machine. Education entered into scene of
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the production system under this reasoning and calculation so as to secure the optimal
interest  of  the  nation  and  to  build  up  the  people’s  “psyche  force,”  that  is,  their
intellectual and moral capacities.  ( Liang,  On the New People, 732-733) 
16 What is striking in Liang’s text, to my mind, is that his mode of argumentation perfectly
represents a typical type of intellectual syncretism in late nineteenth century Japan and
China. In the texts of this period of time, different disciplinary textbooks, social theories
or public forums are all embedded with the views of the eighteenth and the nineteenth
Western thoughts views, especially those of Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer and Jeremy
Bentham and so on. Liang demonstrates a representative case in which we see that he
incorporates and conflates the political, the physiological, the economic and the ethical
laterals  into  the  count  of  the  individual,  and  he  further  entrusts  the  individual,  in
asserting the rationale of the liberalist’s principle of laissez faire, the responsibility of the
management  of  his  own  personal  virtues  and  his  forms  of  life,  or  bios,  in  order  to
contribute his share as a part of the national capital.  Liang Qichao’s project of moral
revolution lays  the ground for  his  sketch of  the new people and the new subject  of
modern China. 
17 Throughout his argumentation for the new people project, Liang Qichao inserts here and
there his passionate and poignant lamentations. “Alas, alas, how can we not fear and
alarmed!” “It is painful and mournful for us not to have our nation to protect us, just as
the orphans without their parents to cling to.” “Horror! Horror! I could not see how our
nation could stand on its own feet.” “I’m deeply ashamed to see our current situation.”
“I’m all tearful when I observe the current conditions of our nation.” “Our young people
are all so fragile that I do not see even a solid society form by a hundred people. Our
nation is coming to its end!”  ( Liang,  On the New People, 657, 664, 665, 666-667, 672, 693,
701-702, 706) 
18 Such strong emotional exclamations, including his identification of the situation to be
ashamed of, feared, worried and alarmed, as well as his rhetoric of the parent-children
metaphor, the cutting line between the beast and the human, the imminent danger of the
nation-state, all reinforce the legitimacy of his argumentations for the ethico-political
economy for the individual in society. The free competition of the liberal economy in the
framework of the autonomous consensus with the nation-state-community therefore is at
work for the new national subject of the modern China.
 
3. The count of psyche in the east Asian neo-
Confucian context
19 The way that psyche or the force of psyche (xinli 心力) is presented as capable of being
counted,  calculated,  regulated,  governed, utilized in order to serve as the production
force  for  the  benefit  of  the  nation is  a  popular  notion in  late  nineteenth and early
twentieth century China. One exemplary text is Liang Qichao’s “On the New People.” The
direct  source  of  Liang Qichao’s  use  of xinli in  that  book is  from a  little  book Zhixin
mianbingfa (治心免病法)  [A  method  for  the  avoidance  of  illness  by  controlling  the  mind]
published in Shanghai in 1896, a translation by John Fryer (傅蘭雅1839-1928) basing on
Henry  Wood’s  Ideal  Suggestion  through  Mental  Photograph. In  this  book,  John  Fryer
translates several different ideas of the power or the procedure of thought as xinli (心力),
and employs the notion of ether and electricity as metaphors to explain the power of
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thought  in  operation.  According  to  him,  the  force  of  thought  is  like  electricity,
transmittable through “ether,” and can be tamed, utilized and harnessed for utility as
long as we learn the laws that govern the force of thought. The phrase “zhixin” (治心)
used  by  John Fryer  in  the  title  of  his  translation  and  throughout  his  book  conveys
explicitly the meaning of “mind-cure” and “mind-governmentality,” both ideas highly
welcomed by late Qing intellectuals. 
20 It  is  significant  to note that  at  this  point  the Christianized New Thought  Movement
popular in the United State starting from mid-nineteenth century was introduced into
Chinese  through  John  Fryer’s  translation.  The  author  of  this  book  Henry  Wood  is
considered as one of the precursors of the New Thought Movement. The advocators for
the New Thought Movement present it as a science to promote the ideas that thought is
power,  and  that  positive  thinking  and  thought  control  could  fundamentally  correct
people’s mode of thinking, but underneath it, according to William James in The Varieties
of Religious Experience, it is actually a religious-oriented movement. (William James, 83-84,
93-94) Wood’s method of mental therapy works particularly on the rhetoric of mental
hygiene. In his argumentation, mental hygiene for the healthy mind is as important as
the physical hygiene for the healthy body. Passivity, pessimism, hesitation, doubtfulness,
weakness and gloominess all  were regarded as vile forms of mind. Negative thoughts
were  untouchable,  and  negative  feelings  were  even  worse.  The  body’s  negative  or
decadent behaviors must be corrected because they indicate the degenerate state of the
mind. Consequently, the mind had to be exposed, monitored, controlled, educated and
modified so that it could be improved and evolved into a better state. This mode of psyche
governmentality resonated very well with the eagerness of the late Qing intellectuals who
were trying very hard to seek a new path for the modern China.
21 Liang’s  using  the  term  xinli,  the  force  of  psyche,  as  the  instrument  to  accumulate,
combine,  unite,  consolidate, strengthen and expand the forces of the people,  and his
comparison of the nation state as a corporation, and the imperial court as the business
office, clearly demonstrates the reasoning of liberalist political economy. The source for
Qiang Qichao’s knowledge of political economy is another influential text translated by
John Fryer and was read and studied by Liang Qichao under his mentor Kang Youwei, that
is, John Hill Burton’s Chambers’s Educational Course: Political Economy for Use in Schools, and
for Private Instruction (abbreviated as Political Economy), one of the educational textbook
series published by the Edingburgh W. & R. Chambers. In Burton’s Political Economy we see
a clear line of argument that follows the liberalist and Benthamian utilitarian reasoning
of self interest, free competition, as well as labor division and cooperation for the optimal
benefit. Burton’s Political Economy was translated into East Asian languages not only by
John Fryer into Chinese as Zuozhi Chuyan (《佐治芻言》) in 1886, but also was translated
into Japanese by Fukusawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉)  as Seiyo Jijo  (Things Western,  西洋事情)
during 1867-1870, and into Korean by Yu Gil-jun (유길준，兪吉濬, 1856-1914) in 1895. 
22 The famous Bunmeiron no Gairyaku (Outline of a theory of civilization, 文明論概略) (1875) by
Fukusawa  Yukichi  already  demonstrates  the  characteristic  features  of  the  political
economical  reasoning of  his time.  Firstly,  Fukusawa Yukichi differentiates civilization
with barbarianism basing on the national subjects’ intellect and spiritual forces (46-49).
Secondly, he suggests that the sum of the opinions and intellect of the whole nation could
show the possibility for revolution or transformation of the society.  Consequently he
proposes to use statistic calculation of  population,  price,  wages,  marriage,  birth rate,
disease and death so that the prosperity and decline of a nation’s civilization could be
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measured (Fukusawa Yukichi 59-72). Thirdly, Fukusawa Yukichi believes that the wealth
of the nation should be dominated by the will of the nation, and the intellect of the nation
should accumulate the wealth of the nation according to the will of the nation (Fukusawa
Yukichi  159-167).  Fukusawa  Yukichi’s  arguments  clearly  demonstrate  the  political
economic reasoning of the link between the nation’s wealth and the management of its
people’s production forces.
23 Fukusawa Yukichi’s knowledge of political economy started in his translation of Burton’s
Political  Economy in 1867,  and his teaching of  political  economy at the same time.  He
translated only the first one-third of Burton’s book and left the practical aspects of trade
and international commerce aside. The reason that Fukusawa Yukichi did not translate
the entire book apparently was because he did not think it was necessary to retranslate
similar  texts  that  were  available  in  Japanese  translations.  Nevertheless,  it  was  also
because, according to Paul B. Trescott, that he was attracted by the moral aspect of this
section that was close to the Confucian idea of natural order, family relations, human
relations, as well as the right and responsibility of the individuals. (Trescott 485) Trescott
also pointed out that Burton’s textbook was one of the large corpuses of textbooks for
schools that flourished in the context of the Scottish enlightenment, many of them were
written by Richard Whately (1787-1863), whose style of writing Burton closely resembles.
(Trescott 496-7) Liang Taigen in discussing Burton’s Political Economy as the common text
in the East Asian context, pointed out that Yu Gil-jun’s book on his foreign learning (서유
견문, 西遊見聞) was highly influenced by Burton’s Political Economy through Fukusawa
Yukichi’s Things Western and Outline of a theory of civilization, and that Yu Gil-jun was the
first Korean intellectual who introduced the social evolutionist theories and the concept
of enlightenment and civilization (Gaehwa 開化),  as well  as Edward Sylvester Morse’s
(1838-1925) evolutionist theories, into Korea. (Liang Taigen 323-351)
24 It is significant for scholars such as Trescott and Liang Taigen to observe the reception
and circulation of Burton’s book on political economy in the East Asian regions. However,
either in Trescott’s emphasis on the moral dimension in Fukusawa Yukichi’s writings, or
in Taigen’s emphasis on the evolutionist version of enlightenment and civilization, the
role political economy played in the process of ethical subjectivation was overlooked. In
Burton’s text, the free and autonomous economic agent is crucial in the entire system of
the political economy. He writes:
Political  economy  …  is  not  a  system  for  controlling  men’s  actions,  but  for
discovering how men are induced by their natural propensities to act: it has not so much
influence in teaching men how to direct each other, as in teaching them the cases
in which control is useless or mischievous. (49, emphasis mine)
25 The issue of government is not in its control, but in its capacity to induce the capacity or
the appetite in each individual, be it intellectual or moral, so that the agent is freely and
autonomously willing to offer his service for the larger community. When the logic of the
political economy is superimposed and incorporated into the logic of ethical economy,
the individual’s intellectual state and moral state are counted as part of the productive
capacity according to the national interest or the collective good defined by the state;
likewise,  the  ethical  and  economic  subject,  or  the  national  subject,  is  placed  in  the
measurement of the line of production. 
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4. Political economy and the ethical subject
intertwined in the knot
26 The ethical subject formulated by Liang Qichao is a subject of truth prescribed to fit the
best interest of the state and is defined by the physiology of the state. Furthermore, this
physiological  structure  of  the  state  treats  the  human  psyche  as  the  object  of  its
governmentality with the logic of political economy. The true subject, or rather, the true
ethico-economic subject in Liang’s vision, is the man as a little machine, as the human
capital, both as the subject and as the object in the ethico-economic regimes, expected to
join the line of production. Tuned with such liberalist vision of the society, the principle
of  the least  government with the maximum effect  is  demanded.  That  is,  as  Foucault
pointed out, the core factor in this management was the mechanism of the formation of
truth basing on the raison d’État. Foucault wrote: “[Instead of] continuing to saturate this
site  of  the  formation  of  truth  with  an  unlimited  regulatory  governmentality,  it  is
recognized — and this is where the shift takes place — that it must be left to function with
the  least  possible  intervention precisely  so  that  it  can  both  formulate  its  truth  and
propose it to governmental practice as rule and norm.” Foucault added that the site of
truth is not in “the heads of economists,” but is “the market.” (Foucault 2008: 29-30) 
27 What is the market for the state? Foucault points out that it is nothing else except for the
site of justice, of values, of price, and of veridiction. The useful and the utilizable turn out
to be veridical and desirable. Through the sense of interest, the government can hold on
everything that exists for it, “in the form of individuals, actions, words, wealth, resources,
property, rights and so forth” (Foucault 2008: 45). The entire strategy of governmentality
therefore relies not on the total control but on the law of life, that is, the rules for a game,
“in which each remains master regarding himself and his part, then the judicial, instead
of being reduced to the simple function of applying the law, acquires a new autonomy and
importance” (Foucault 2008: 175). The autonomy of the individual therefore is essential in
the self-governmentality of the regime of ethics as well as the regime of truth. To analyze
the mechanism of this regime, Foucault suggests, we do not need to analyze the historical
logic of processes, but should undertake instead the analysis of the “internal rationality”
or the “wage” of  individuals’  activity.  The wage,  or the income,  reconsidered in this
context,  is  the  capital  or,  as  Irving  Fisher  points  out,  the  source  of  future  income
(Foucault 2008: 223-230). 
28 Liang’s entire project for the new people is certainly based on such type of the molding
and shaping, through cultivation and education, of the people into the ethical-economic
subject of the modern China. The individual in this economic and political framework is
then viewed not merely as human labor but as the source of future income, as an earning
machine  or  the  human  capital.  The  formation  of  the  human  capital  into  effective
productive machine is the telos of governmentality and of educational investments. The
fundamental  reasoning  in  this  logic,  the  “regressive  end  point”  in  the  analysis,  as
Foucault phrased, is the calculation of the “painful or non-painful nature” of the situation
(Foucault  2008:  272).  Liang’s  repeated emphasis  of  the  threat  of  the  invasion by the
foreign countries had already successfully depicted a picture of danger. The self-interest
and self-preservation, viewed with the interest and preservation of the nation, is the
anchorage  for  subjective  will  and  action.  Partaking  in  the  act  of  the  production /
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preservation in the name of national interest then is rationalized as a moral imperative
for the new ethical subject. 
29 The difficult  question Foucault  posed for us in The Hermeneutics of  the  Subject on the
problem of the ethical subject is: “Am I really the ethical subject of the truth I know?”
(Foucault 2005: 487) The subject constituted by the form of reflexivity specific to certain
type of care of the self,  the mastery of tekhne over bios,  according to Foucault, is the
ethical subject of truth appears and is experienced. However, this ethical subject thus
appeared and experienced has been formed through the knowledge, education and the
particular tekhne over bios at different moments in history. Foucault writes: 
Although the theory of political power as an institution usually refers to a juridical
conception  of  the  subject  of  right,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  analysis  of
governmentality--that is to say, of power as a set of reversible relationships--must
refer to an ethics of the subject defined by the relationship of self to self. Quite
simply, this means that in the type of analysis I have been trying to advance for
some time you can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of
the  self  and of  others,  and the  relationship  of  self  to  self  constitute  a  chain,  a
thread, and I think it is around these notions that we should be able to connect
together the question of politics and the question of ethics. (Foucault 2005: 252) 
30 The question arises exactly when the logic of ethics was superimposed with other logics
and other telos, be it the religious supreme imperatives, or the political common good for
the nation-sate, or the economic interest of the entrepreneurs. The problem of ethics is
crucial if we want to analyze the notion of governmentality. 
31 The significance of Liang Qichao’s discourse of the political economy of the ethical subject
lies in the fact that it reflected the sort of discursive mode popular in late nineteenth
century Japan, late Qing China as well as the early Republic. After the Meiji Restoration,
discourses of ethics had been fused with the physiological ideas of the state and were
dominated by biological-evolutionist theories. The Japanese Ministry of Education was
strongly promoting theories  of  the State  as  a  natural  and organic  body.  One typical
example  that  could  illustrate  the  discursive  situation  was  the  translation  of  Gustav
Adolph Constantin Frantz’s (佛郎都) Physiologie der Staaten (physiology of the State 國家
生理學) into Japan in 1884. The Meiji Ministry of Education conducted the translation of
this book, as in many other cases. The publication of the translation reflected the policies
of  Ito  Hirobumi  and Mori  Arinori  who advocated for  the  modernization of  Japanese
education system.  Frantz states  repeatedly in his  book that  the main concern of  his
writing was “political physiology” or “State physiology.” He treats the state as an organic
body, similar to a plant or animal. If the circulation of the “fluids” within the body does
not  function  smoothly,  then  the  State  would  be  weak.  Furthermore,  the  internal
organization of the State must be determined by the State’s purpose, just as the organic
parts of an animal dominated by its head. The government is the principal organ charged
with the task of achieving the goals of the State. (Frantz, 179-180) Frantz’s notion of the
physiology of the State was translated in the book in kanji as Kokutai (國體),  literary
national  body,  and was widely circulated in the contemporary discourses  that  lasted
through  the  first  several  decades  of  the  twentieth  century.  Inoue  Tetsujiro’s  1891
“Commentary  on  the  Imperial  Edict  on  Education,”  for  example,  presented  a
physiological view of the State and a hierarchic understanding of ethics of the national
subject under the service of the State. Educational principles in the ethical mode are
phrased, such as: “A ruler is to his people as parents are to their children,” “A nation is
like an organic body...The ruler is like the mind, the people like the body and limbs.” In
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“An Outline of Citizen Morality” Inoue further argued that the state was closely linked to
citizen morality. Citizen morality was an important part of the education of citizens, and
education provided citizens with the fundamental ability to defend themselves and their
country.  The  State  was  the  organization  that  governs  the  functioning  of  the  entire
country. Inoue stressed that sovereignty was the basis of the State, and legal sovereignty
lied in the rule of the imperial family. Therefore Shinto, respect for ancestors and loyalty
were all used to strengthen the state. Inoue even presented a metaphor of the cellular
state,  explaining  the  importance  of  the  loyalty  of  the  cells:  the  unity  of  social
organizations, the centre of national unity, was imperial rule; and this centre was like a
body with its cells. The head was the centre of the body; the cells were all parts of the
body. If the cells were not loyal, and plotted against the centre, then the body would fall
ill.  (Inoue  180-4) Inoue’s  mode  of  argument  is  literally  a  reiteration  of  Frantz’s
physiological theory of the State.
32 Liang Qichao’s project of the new people echoed the Japanese discursive contexts of the
national body with its combination of the Hobbesian version of the physiological and
contractual nation superimposed with an Adam Smithian model of national wealth and
his theories of moral sentiments. Situated against the light shed by Foucault’s analysis of
the political economy of the liberalist governmentality, we see more clearly how Liang
Qichao’s syncretism of the above-mentioned contexts is structured. When Liang counts
psyche force and the moral force as the productive labor that the individual could and
should offer to the group, he also measures such qualities in terms of the interest of the
nation in the name of truth. In addition to the political economy of this line of thoughts,
we actually see in Liang Qichao’s discourse of the new people the converging point of
both the Political Economy by Burton and the Ideal Suggestion through Mental Photograph by
Henry Wood,  both translated by the famous minister-translator John Fryer.  Rüstow’s
definition  of  Vitalpolitik perfectly  illustrates  the  practice  of  bio-politics  in  the  early
modern China: a “a policy of life” with which not only the worker’s labor but also “the
worker’s whole vital situation, his real, concrete situation, from morning to night and
from  night  to  morning,”  as  well  as  the “material  and  moral  hygiene,  the  sense  of
property, the sense of social integration,” are all counted (quoted by Foucault, The Birth of
Biopolitics.  p.  157n).  John  Fryer’s  translation  of  Burton’s  Political  Economy and  Henry
Wood’s  Ideal  Suggestion  through  Mental  Photograph  symptomatically  foregrounds  the
emotional demand of the age for the appropriate forms of knowledge to govern human
behavior and human psyche, the former moving from the management of the market to
the management of individuals’ moral behaviors, and the latter moving from the internal
government  of  the  moral  hygiene  and  extending  to  that  of  the  social  hygiene.  The
meeting place of these two strategic movements of governmentality is the discursive knot
of xin, psyche.
 
5. Xin: the knot, revisiting the crossroads of early
modern China
33 It  is at this meeting point that the images associated with the notion of the xin,  the
psyche, are threaded, in the movement of the loop (la volte), as Foucault said in his The
Hermeneutics  of  the  Subject. The  images  around  the  central  nucleus  ( noyau)  are  the
discursive practices that we analyze in the late nineteenth century China. John Fryer’s
usage of xinli (psyche force), with an analogy of electricity, as the tamable, correctable
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and utilizable forces points to the governing and the monitoring of thought that would be
practiced in later governments, while his translated terms of production as shengli（生利
）echoes the ancient text of The Great Learning and persuades the Chinese intellectuals
the  necessity  of  the  individuals’  serving  the  nation  as  human  capital.  Liang  Qichao
cleverly appropriates the term “xinli” introduced by John Fryer and situated this xinli in
the ethico-political economic regime for his project of the new people and his moral
enlightenment.  Liang’s  careful  deliberations  of  the  virtues  for  individual’s  political
capacities manages to involve the individual’s ethical position in the frame of the society
or the nation-state that allows us to discuss the connection between the question of
politics and the question of ethics.
34 The physiological thinking of the individual’s rights and responsibilities with the nation-
state is exactly the opposite to phusiologia as discussed by Foucault in his Hermeneutics of
the Subject. Phusiologia is the “knowledge of nature” (phusis) that would enable individuals
“to take pride in what is their own and not what derives from circumstances” (Foucault,
The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 241), and this form of knowledge is different to paideia or
selbstbildung,  which is the culture of self,  “a cultural learning whose end is glory, the
display that gives men a name,” that Epicurus criticized (Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the
Subject, 239). 
35 In Liang’s and his contemporaries’ modes of elaborations concerning the images of xin,
along with the discourse of education and the cultivation of the self, the logic of politics
and that of ethics converged on the economy of the State, that is, the count and the
government of psyche. Such mode of paideia for the new people prescribed by Liang’s
circles around the technê of bios (technê tou biou) and the disposition of the individual’s
ethical  life  for  the  service  of  the  State.  We  have  observed  analogous  modes  of
argumentation in Dr. Sun Yatsen’s (孫中山) theory of revolution that the mind of the
people have to be cured and governed before the nation can be saved (jiuguo bixian zhixin).
Chiang Kaishek, likewise, elaborated his theory of the “Law of the Heart for Revolution” (
geming xinfa) in his program of the New Life Movement in 1934, a movement of total
education and militarization of the entire nation. Mao Zedong also confessed that he was
very much influenced by Tan Sitong’s Xin li Shuo “Essay on the Psyche Force.” Not only
political  leaders,  but  also the majority of  the public  opinions,  including intellectuals,
shared similar conceptions of the psyche force. Du Yaquan, to name just one example,
introduced various version of ethico-political economy, including Franz’s physiology of
the state, throughout the time from 1900 to 1923, when he served as the chief editor of
Dongfang Zazhi, the most popular and wide-read semi-intellectual magazine of his time. He
repeatedly insists on the importance of the revolution of the xin (心) so that the national
body (國體) can be reformed into a healthy state and that the moles in the society should
be cleansed. He also advocates in his  high school  textbook Philosophy of  Life that  the
individual in society is like the cell in an organic body, and that the continuation of the
whole race is closely related with the healthy cell. The individual should move toward the
practicing and realization of the idealized self and the elimination of the customary old
self. We see the circulation of the ethical-political-economy of the bio-ethic-politics from
the late  Qing intellectuals  down to  the  May-Fourth enlightenment  movement  of  the
modern China.
36 A different case at the same turning point,  as I  discussed in a separate paper, of the
interpretation of xinli could be observed in Tan Sitong’s (譚嗣同) writings. (Liu 2009a) In
Tan’s texts of Renxue, the book of Love, published in 1897, we see that the psyche force
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defined by him is a dynamic topological continuum. The idea of psyche force as pure
negativity allows each body to exist as a singular being, renewable through the force of
instant appearing and disappearing of thoughts. To Tan Sitong, this constant local motion
of the psyche force keeps the psyche space an open system and altered according to the
encounters of the external bodies in the world. Each one is a multitude and opens to yet
another multitude, as set opens to multiple subsets. The radical equality of the singular
beings is suggested by this notion of such ontological multitude. Tan’s psyche force as
“micro-appearing-disappearing” unsettled the consolidation of  the utilitarian psyche-
electricity discourse of his time and challenged the nominal system of the ideological
construction of Confucianism. Furthermore, through this dynamic topological perception
of being, or the onto-logy, we see the possibility for the force of infinite questioning, the
immanent singularity of the thought-to-come. In Tan’s philosophy, we see not only a
radical political view of the equality of beings, but also a radical view of the ethics that is
freed from any fixed nominal ideology of ethics. However, Tan’s Buddhist-inspired vision
was not pursued. Instead, the road of revolution was ensued after his martyrdom through
Liang Qichao’s appropriation of Tan’s writings. It is the biggest irony that we’ve observed
in the eve of modern China.
37 Another  example.  Wang  Guowei’s  (王國維)  translations  of  the  utilitarian  ethics  and
education theory at the turn of the twentieth century revealed clearly the role that he
played as an intellectual that helped instituting modern ideas. His participation both in
the publication of the journal Educational World and later in the Ministry of Education of
late Qing government fit into the plans of Luo Zhenyu (羅振玉). The impact that Wang
and Luo together produced on the Chinese intellectual world was profound. Those early
twentieth century theories  of  ethics  and education became the main axis  of  Chinese
ethical thoughts throughout the twentieth century. Wang’s philosophical writings during
1904-1097, however, reached on another level. In the series of writings that he explored
of the limits of Western and classical Chinese ethics, he tackled with the limitations of
dualism. Wang Guowei criticized the intellectuals such as Liang Qichao who clung to
utilitarian and political purposes so that they cannot practice philosophical thinking. He
criticized utilitarianism and shengsheng zhuyi (life-ism 生生主義) that were popular at his
time, especially the ones advocated by Liang Qichao. As an alternative, he developed a
notion  of  wusheng  zhuyi (no-life-ism  無生主義).  Life-ism  to  Wang  Guowei  is  the
continuous expansion and preservation of  life,  while no-life-ism is the subtraction of
personal subjective will of life. No-life-ism is not a negative or pessimistic account of
humanity.  Through  retreating  from  the  position  of  the  subject  that  submits  to  the
utilitarian and teleological purposes of politics, the subject could obtain a clearer state of
mind. Wang’s contemporaries did not follow the path of his philosophical thought either.
(Liu 2009b)
38 Liang Qichao, the activist of the revolution and the enlightenment in favor of a modern
China, situated himself in an engaging and intervening position as an active subject. His
teachings educated a whole generation of modern Chinese subjects, including the May 4
activists. Tan Sitong and Wang Guowei also belonged to this topological knot of the age,
but they respectively proposed their different views of the psyche and ethics that was a
move subtracted and deviated from the utilitarian count of psyche. Such paths, however,
were not taken because the revolution was on the wave. 
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